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Abstract 
The paper (i) briefly surveys India‘s policy choices over the reform period with respect to 
liberalization of the capital account, their underlying rationale and politics, (ii) 
demonstrates the kinds of capital inflows that resulted; their special characteristics, (iii) 
assesses the contributions of the inflows; their risks and stresses for policy, and (iv) 
examines the impact of and handling of the East Asian and the Global Financial Crisis. 
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Introduction 
There has been a sharp escalation in capital flowing into India following the early 
nineties reforms liberalizing entry and exit for private Foreign Investments
1
 (FIs). Inflows 
were more than just a portfolio rebalancing following permission for entry; there was also 
a general fall in home bias in asset allocation. Entry barriers were lifted just as 
technology lowered transaction costs of investing abroad and made restrictions difficult. 
Lower interest rates in the developed world pushed fund managers to seek higher returns 
in emerging markets even as reforms and higher growth reduced risk. Developed 
countries, particularly the US, had a comparative advantage in the provision of financial 
services, and therefore pushed for liberalization, even as it itself turned more towards 
self- regulation. As a consequence leverage exploded, magnifying cross border flows.  
 
Facing inflows is an inevitable part of globalization. The latter has many potential 
benefits, which can fructify with the correct strategic response. Inflows do make more 
resources available, demonstrate better organization and technology, offer a stimulus to 
local investment, an opportunity for better allocation of world savings, and for better 
price discovery in markets.  
 
But inflows to emerging markets (EMs) are subject to sudden stops or reversals due to 
infectious panics unrelated to fundamentals. Herd behaviour can cause, or at least 
magnify, cumulative worsening expectations. These are external shocks facing EMs. The 
East Asian and the global financial crisis interrupted jumps in inflows. Inadequacies in 
the international financial architecture compound the problems, forcing EMs to adopt 
costly self-insurance measures. Reserve accumulation occurs also because of limited 
absorptive capacity. But this, and oil surpluses, imply a flow from the poor to rich as 
reserves are invested abroad.  
 
                                                 
1
 These include Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) and other long- and 
short-term investment flows. 
 3 
India has a policy strategy in this context and it can be described as ―middling through‖. 
There has been some deregulation, to take advantage of the wave, yet protect against the 
volatility; to develop markets even while restricting foreign participation until they reach 
full maturity and can handle volatility. Deregulation distinguished between types and 
direction of flows. Liberalization was much greater for equity compared to debt flows 
including bank loans, and for foreign compared to domestic residents. The rationale was 
equity, in contrast to debt, shares in risk. Therefore liabilities are reduced in a crisis. For 
example, as markets fall during outflows the value remitted is lower. Debt inflows are 
more difficult to service in difficult times while equity takes a write down. Inflows have 
to be allowed to go out if they are to come in, but continuing restrictions on domestic 
capital outflows can reduce the reserve cover required. Limits on foreign loans prevent 
excessive borrowing in response to domestic distortions, even while selective relaxation 
makes credit available for productive purposes.  
 
We examine the effectiveness of the Indian strategy
2
. While middling through increases 
tools available with a policymaker, it can give too much discretion. Judgements made 
under considerable uncertainty can sometimes be lacking. A possible solution is to write 
more complex rules, closely tailored to the context, thus reducing discretion to the 
minimum necessary. Such a principled pragmatism implies although a river is crossed 
feeling the stones, knowledge of the riverbed allows one to anticipate some of the stones.  
 
Capital account convertibility: Consequences 
Table 1 shows the rise in different categories of inflows following liberalization. 
Permitted types of flows vary in their time horizon, volatility and the arbitrage 
opportunities they respond to.  
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 The analysis builds upon and expands earlier work. References not given because of space constraints are 
available at www.igidr.ac.in/~ashima. Figures quoted, unless otherwise mentioned, are from RBI and 
Ministry of Finance websites. 
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Table 1: Foreign Inflows in India 
 
FDI      
(USD b) 
FPI       
(USD b) 
FI total 
(USD b) 
NRI 
deposits 
(USD b) 
ECBs      
(USD b) 
Change in 
reserves  
(Inc-) (USD 
b) 
Current 
account 
Capital 
account  
       % of GDP (deficit minus) 
1990-91 0.1 0.01 0.1 2.1 2.3 1.3 -3.0 2.3 
1991-92 0.1 0.004 0.1 5.8 1.5 -3.4 -0.3 1.5 
1992-93 0.3 0.2 0.6 2.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.7 1.6 
1993-94 0.6 3.6 4.2 1.2 0.7 -8.7 -0.4 3.5 
1994-95 1.3 3.8 5.1 1.0 1.1 -4.6 -1.0 2.8 
1995-96 2.1 2.8 4.9 1.0 1.3 2.9 -1.6 1.3 
1996-97 2.8 3.3 6.1 3.3 2.9 -5.8 -1.2 2.9 
1997-98 3.6 1.8 5.4 1.2 4.0 -3.9 -1.4 2.5 
1998-99 2.5 -0.1 2.4 1.0 4.4 -3.8 -1.0 2.0 
1999-00 2.2 3.0 5.2 1.5 0.3 -6.1 -1.0 2.5 
2000-01 4.0 2.8 6.8 2.3 4.3 -5.8 -0.6 1.9 
2001-02 6.1 2.0 8.2 2.7 -1.6 -11.8 0.7 1.8 
2002-03 5.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 -1.7 -17.0 1.2 2.1 
2003-04 4.3 11.4 15.7 3.6 -2.9 -31.4 2.3 2.9 
2004-05 6.1 9.3 15.4 -1.0 5.2 -26.2 -0.4 4.1 
2005-06 9.0 12.5 21.5 3.7 2.5 -15.1 -1.2 3.1 
2006-07 22.8 7.0 29.8 4.3 16.1 -36.6 -1.1 4.9 
2007-08 34.4 29.4 63.8 0.2 22.6 -92.2 -1.5 9.2 
2008-09 35.2 -13.9 21.3 4.3 8.2 20.1 -2.4 0.6 
Source: calculated from http://www.rbi.org.in 
 
There was steady acceleration in both net FDI and FPI
3
. FDI requires stable growth 
prospects. Even in China the big jump came about ten years after opening out. For India a 
big jump came in 2006-07 and higher levels continued despite the global crisis. Gross 
inflows were even higher, since Indian firms began investing abroad.  
 
                                                 
3
 After falling to $3b in Q4 of the crisis year 2008, FIs were back at $15b in Q1 of the next year. FPI swung 
from a negative –11.3$b over April-Dec. 2008, to a positive $23.6b over the corresponding period in 2009, 
while FDI remained steadily positive. 
 5 
FPI shows more fluctuations, turning briefly negative during the East Asian crisis. It 
peaked at $29.4b in 2007-08 but 2008-09 saw outflows of $13.8b. Inflows during the 
period when stock markets were moving up were 3 times larger than outflows during 
equivalent movements down
4
, demonstrating the risk sharing effect (Figure 1).  
 
 Source: Calculated with data from RBI and BSE. 
        Note: M refers to the month of the year. 
 
Figure 1 shows FPI to be more volatile than the BSE index with possible mutual 
causation between the two
5. The rise in stock indices, or Tobin‘s q, helps firms raise 
money. Anticipation of firms‘ better performance induces more investment. Loans 
become easier to get and more venture capital enters. The policy studies literature does 
show that higher equity inflows have been associated with higher level of domestic 
investment (Henry, 2007). India demonstrated this in the high growth period of 2003-08, 
as the ratio of gross investment to GDP rose from 25.2 to 39.1. Firms benefited, but 
households did not. Retail participation shrank after reforms, which raised entry costs for 
the average investor. Markets remained narrow in many respects, and therefore 
excessively volatile. Free foreign entry was allowed in mutual funds, which were 
                                                 
4
 In the two years prior to October 2007 the BSE stock index rose from 8000 to 20,000 and FPI inflows 
were $ 47 billion. But over the next year, as stock markets fell back to 8000, outflows were only $15 
billion.  
5
 The respective coefficients of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) are 5.7 and 0.22. 
Time series studies confirm the causation. 
 6 
supposed to give savers more options, and develop the financial services industry taking 
local skills to international levels. But mutual funds focused on the high end, and on 
firms. Thus foreign entry is not a panacea. Other conditions also have to be in place. 
Eventual internationalization of Indian financial services is required as Indian companies 
go global. But the sequencing has to be correct.  
 
Relaxation of External Commercial Borrowing (ECB) norms in 2006 aggravated net 
inflows, despite liberalization also of firms‘ investment outflows. Since domestic interest 
rates exceeded foreign and the exchange rate was expected to appreciate, firms borrowed 
abroad to finance ambitious investment plans.  
 
NRI flows did not show the same amplification. They respond to opportunities for 
interest rate arbitrage, but NRI deposit rates were capped in the later years. So NRI 
inflows were quite low when other types of inflows were booming. 
 
The Table also shows there was a current account deficit (CAD) during much of the 
period but it remained limited. Since the positive capital account far exceeded the 
negative current account, a large part of the capital flows were absorbed as reserves
6
. 
 
The CAD is also the excess of domestic savings over investment. A small CAD implied 
the contribution of foreign savings to financing the resource gap remained small, 
although they may have contributed to relieving sectoral financing constraints and to 
developing markets. Empirical tests largely have found that only countries with strong 
domestic institutions, markets and government finances benefit from foreign inflows. 
These features determine absorptive capacity that reduces volatility and also gives 
countries the ability to withstand volatility.  
 
Since macroeconomic policy affects the investment savings gap, the extent of reserve 
accumulation is a policy decision. The alternative is to allow appreciation, which would 
                                                 
6
 India‘s foreign currency reserves peaked at $ 315.66 billion in June 2008 and had fallen to 262 billion in 
end March 2009, when they exceeded India‘s foreign debt by just $ 22 billion. Although outflows were 
only $20 billion, much of the fall was due to valuation effects.   
 7 
increase net imports and the CAD. If temporary capital inflows determine the real 
exchange rate—it would deviate from equilibrium. Large persistent current account 
surpluses do require appreciation but not persistent deficits as in India. Since exports are 
part of a labour absorbing development strategy, and have to match rising imports, the 
exchange rate has to be competitive. Even so, there was greater exchange rate flexibility. 
Some appreciation and two-way movement occurred as the dollar depreciated after 2003. 
 
Moreover, reserves provide confidence to financial markets. Other ways of absorbing 
inflows were selective easing of outflows by domestic residents and trade liberalization. 
Supporting the domestic investment environment, for example by reducing the gap 
between domestic and foreign interest rates, also absorbs inflows, but this depends also 
on deepening markets and reducing administrative interventions—a general rise in 
absorptive capacity. Given India‘s higher interest rates, the sterilization7 of reserve 
accumulation, to maintain targeted rates of money supply growth, imposed large interest 
costs borne by the Government, (explicitly shown in the Budget), RBI and banks. 
 
Table 2: Equity and Debt Flows to Emerging Markets 
Billions of USD 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009f 2010f 
Private flows, net 
229.0 330.9 528.3 561.8 887.8 392.3 140.5 373.2 
of which         
  Equity investment, net 138.5 195.1 250.4 223.8 296.9 185.6 240.9 250.0 
of which         
   Direct equity investment, net 103.2 154.7 197.4 172.1 304.8 277.9 215.4 225.1 
   Portfolio equity investment,  
   Net 35.4 40.4 53.0 51.7 -8.0 -92.3 25.5 24.9 
Commercial banks, net 29.8 58.8 181.0 223.4 398.1 91.5 -91.9 57.5 
Credit flows, net 33.4 60.2 180.2 222.0 395.5 90.3 -92.6 56.8 
 Other private creditors, net 60.7 77.1 96.9 114.6 192.8 115.2 -8.5 65.6 
                                                 
7
 As foreign assets replaced domestic securities in the Reserve Bank of India‘s (RBI) balance sheet, its 
stock of government securities was nearing depletion. A Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS), consisting of 
91-day to 1-year government bonds, was introduced in March 2004. The government issued new bonds 
whose proceeds were sequestered in a special account with the RBI, thus neutralizing the liquidity impact 
of RBI‘s FX purchase. During capital outflows in 2008 is was possible to buy back MSS securities, which 
contributed to financing expanded government borrowing requirements because of the fiscal stimulus. 
 8 
Note: 'f = Institute of International Finance (IIF) forecast 
Source: Calculated from http://www.iif.com/ 
 
 
The sharp rise in inflows after 2003 was also due to external factors. Table 2 shows the 
surge in different types of capital flows into EMs. Post crisis forecasts do not expect 2007 
type of peaks given deleveraging. To the extent the peak was an aberration due to 
regulatory weakness in developed countries, self-insurance and restrictions against the 
surge was the correct policy response. While equity flows rose, the sharpest rise was in 
credit flows. India‘s restrictions on banks8 and on debt flows protected it from this surge. 
East European countries that had allowed free entry of foreign banks suffered the most. 
Large foreign inflows were intermediated through these banks but when they were in 
trouble home country rescue packages were not available to the branches.  
 
IMF data also shows that private foreign inflows to EMs fell in the period following the 
East Asian crisis, but more than doubled to an annual average of about $ 200 billion over 
2003-06, peaking at 617.5 billion in 2007
9
. It has been argued that US monetary policy 
that kept rates low was responsible for the flood into EMs, seeking higher returns. But 
US policy interest rates had been held at 1 percent over June 2003 to June 2004, and were 
raised after that. So if low US interest rates were driving the flows they should have been 
highest in 2003-04 not in 2007, when the federal fund rate peaked at 5.25 percent. 
Leverage enhanced flows in response to profit opportunities.  
 
Nominal amounts outstanding in derivatives grew from $100 trillion in 2002 to $516 
trillion in April 2007 (BIS, 2007). Since 2000 the market for mortgage-backed securities 
exceeded that for US treasury notes and bonds. Asset backed securities peaked at $4.1 
trillion in 2006 and credit default swaps at $57 trillion in June 2008.  Open positions as 
part of the carry trade facilitated cross border flows. Although the cost of replacing 
contracts and the credit exposure are much lower, notional amounts capture the open 
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Compulsory reserve requirements (CRR), statutory liquidity requirements (SLR), limits on open positions, 
securitization etc. constrain the ability of Indian banks to intermediate foreign borrowing. 
9
 The figures are calculated from data available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/tables.pdf 
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interest. In 2004 the US securities regulator, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
relaxed the net capital rule or ceiling of twelve times capital on borrowing for investment 
banks, allowing them to use their own models to determine risk. As a result leverage shot 
up; when Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail its leverage was 30:1 compared to 15:1 
for a commercial bank. The 33 percent compound annual rate of growth in derivatives 
occurred just over the period regulations were relaxed.   
 
Compared to this growth in derivatives, other sources of liquidity were trivial: US broad 
money supply growth, for example, averaged about $15 trillion with an annual growth 
rate of about 6 percent
10
. Modern financial markets have large powers to endogenously 
create liquidity, and a strong motive to do so in good times. Poor incentive features and 
the lack of universal regulation increased this procyclicality.  
 
Capital account convertibility: Politics 
A political economy, overturned by events, underlay the gradual process of capital 
account convertibility (CAC). Financial interests, and the IMF dominated by these 
interests, strongly pushed for full capital account liberalization in the 90s. Since financial 
reforms were easy to do compared to difficult domestic institutional reform, and there 
were attractive potential kickbacks, policy makers were also inclined to liberalize. But the 
East Asian crisis threw a spanner in the works as the costs of CAC ahead of domestic 
financial reform became clear.  
 
In India lobbying varied from those who wanted full CAC and a flexible exchange rate, 
to those who would restrict all types of inflows and control market activity. Apart from 
extreme pro- and anti-market positions, there were also serious analytical issues. Those 
who wanted more controls were concerned about crises from volatile flows, fiscal 
vulnerability, Dutch disease and appreciation hurting an export led growth strategy, or 
inflow driven asset bubbles in narrow domestic markets (Nachane, 2007, Sen, 2007). 
Those for faster CAC wanted more market-led innovation, an end to financial repression 
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 The figures are calculated with data available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/default.htm. 
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and distortions, and the chance to develop India as a center for financial services given its 
skilled manpower (Rajan
11
, 2009).  
 
The first Tarapore Committee (1997) set out macro preconditions for CAC, including 
improved government finances and current account, and the second (Tarapore, 2006) set 
out the micro-institutional development required in financial markets. But the East Asian 
crises overturned the first and the global financial crisis overturned the second 
committee‘s recommendations for faster liberalization. Thus CAC proceeded slowly, as 
did the task of strengthening domestic markets and policy institutions
12
. There was real 
progress in the latter, notwithstanding complaints about regulatory speed breakers. 
  
Extreme pro-market positions could not survive the repeated crises, absence of serious 
reform in the international financial architecture, and excessive leverage due to foreign 
regulatory lapses. But anti-market forces could not survive the reaction to stifling past 
controls, the need for financing growth, and pressures to keep up with developments 
elsewhere. For example FX (foreign exchange) futures were allowed in Indian stock 
exchanges after they were started at the Dubai exchange. Box 1 illustrates the 
development of the Indian FX market. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Box 1: Indian FX Markets 
 
Table 3 and 4 show both the very low level of Indian FX markets, and the extreme 
rapidity of their development. The average daily turnover in Indian FX markets, which 
was about US $3.0 billion in 2001, grew to US $34 billion in 2007, one of the fastest 
rates of growth among world markets (Table 3). 
 
                                                 
11
 The macroeconomic section in the report expressed the naïve view that giving capital more freedom in 
good times would induce it to be more loyal in bad times. But capital is driven by expected returns. 
Strength attracts it and weakness, or even a hint of weakness, leads to exit.    
12
 There were considerable developments in the money, equity, and FX markets, and in strengthening 
regulatory frameworks. 
 11 
Table 3:FX Turnover Compared to Other Sources of Currency Transactions 
USD 
billion 
Daily FX turnover (April) 
Merchandise 
trade, daily 
average 
FX inflow, daily 
average 
 2001 
 Percent of 
world total 
2007 
 Percent of 
world 
total 
2000 2007 2000 2007 
Australia 52 3.22 170 4.26 0.46 1.05 0.04 0.06 
India 3 0.18 34 0.85 0.38 1.17 0.03 0.18 
Note: (1) Foreign inflows are measured as the current account deficit plus reserve gains. (2) Merchandise trade 
is calculated as exports plus imports of goods and services (absolute values) (3) FX turnover is on net-gross 
basis and includes spot, outright forwards and swap transactions. 
Source: Calculated from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2007, Table E16, pp. 82, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07a.pdf), the International Financial Statistics  (IMF, various years). 
 
Table 4: Aspects of the Indian FX Market 
 
USD billion 
FCY/INR
a 
2001-02 2006-07 
1 
Total spot turnover (sales + 
purchases) 
450.16 2085.39 
2 
Total spot intervention (sales 
+ purchases) 
385.81 316.88 
3 2 as % of 1 8.57 1.52 
4 
Share of 1 due to 
interbank(%) 
64.75 67.08 
5 
Share of 1 due to 
merchant(%) 
35.25 32.91 
6 
Total forward as % of total 
spot 
20.82 22.94 
7 
Total swap as % of total 
spot
b 149.63 61.01 
8 Total spot (for April)
c 
30.38 252.53 
9 
Share due to RDs (from CB 
survey) (%) 
68.15 78.02 
10 
Share due to other financial 
insts. (%) 
5.76 10.49 
11 
Share of non-financial 
insts.(%) 
26.09 11.49 
12 
Share in total spot of local 
transactions(%) 
95.98 89.86 
13 
Share in total spot of cross 
border tran.(%) 
4.02 10.15 
14 
Total FX derivatives as % of 
total spot 
0.06 226.77 
Note: Items (1) to (7) were calculated from RBI bulletins. The data was collected 
for all the months in the given years and summed up. Each year is taken from July 
to June. (8) to (14) are figures for the month of April as is available in the Central 
Bank (CB) Surveys (BIS). (9) to (14) are as percentage to (8); FCY: Foreign 
currency; INR:  Indian rupees; RDs: Reporting dealers 
a All transactions involve exposure to more than one currency 
b Excluding ―tomorrow/next day‖ transactions 
c A swap is considered to be a single transaction in that the two legs are not counted 
separately. Including ―tomorrow/next day‖ transactions 
 12 
 
Deepening shows in the expansion of the turnover relative to trade transactions (Table 3) 
sharp increase in derivative trade, cross border transactions, and decrease in the share of 
the RBI
13
 transactions (Table 4); advent of electronic trading and communication 
platforms, which reduce transaction costs and risks; falling bid-ask spreads; changing 
profile of customers from passive price takers in foreign trade related services, to FIIs 
and to corporates taking ECB loans, or undertaking mergers and acquisitions. Corporates 
sometimes had treasuries as large and sophisticated as those of banks. 
 
Gradual reforms followed comprehensive blueprints set by various government 
committees starting in 1995. Earlier policy sought to limit hedging tools to entities with 
direct underlying foreign exchange exposures. However, since a larger set of economic 
agents now had foreign exchange risk there was a shift to ―economic exposure‖ (the 
effect of exchange rates on a firm's value), to allow flexibility in managing FX risk. 
 
Even so, Indian derivative trading remains a small fraction of that in other EMs such as 
Mexico or South Korea. In futures markets intra-day trades dominate, and open interest 
that denotes hedging activity is low. Liquidity and robustness to shocks is far from that in 
the US market. Short-term instruments with maturities of less than one year dominate, 
and activity is concentrated among a few banks.  As elsewhere, FX transactions are 
mostly over-the-counter structured by banks. The most widely used derivative 
instruments are the forwards and foreign exchange swaps (rupee-dollar). But because of 
user demand for liquid and transparent exchange traded hedging products, currency 
futures were started in 2008 and later extended to multiple currencies. Multilateral netting 
on market platforms saves transaction cost. Guarantees from the trade date reduce foreign 
exchange settlement and counterparty risk.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 The low intervention figure for 2006-07 is actually special to that year since there were only purchases 
and no sales. Purchases more than doubled the next year as inflows rose. Equivalent purchases only in 
2001-02 were $23 billion. The share of intervention was 10.4 in 2003-04, but has fallen in recent years. 
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Liberalization: Surviving crises 
Did opening out, during a period when major global crises occurred, benefit India? The 
presumption in liberalizing reforms was the country could handle volatility, but the sheer 
size of global crises was not foreseen. There were benefits, since the trend rate of growth 
was higher, and there was development of new growth foci so that growth was no longer 
government driven. India did not have a financial crisis, but growth became volatile. The 
slowdowns over 1997-2002 and in 2008-09 can be attributed partly to international crises 
and partly to policy mistakes in handling.  
 
Middling through gives a lot of discretion to policy-makers and this can be used with 
varying degrees of effectiveness. Monetary policy has a challenging task to support 
inclusive growth, withstand volatile flows of unprecedented magnitude, and prevent asset 
bubbles in narrow markets, even while deepening and crises proofing those markets. It 
succeeded spectacularly in most objectives, but a policy more attuned to context could 
have reduced volatility and further improved economic performance.  
 
Sharp interest rate rise in response to exchange rate volatility during the East Asian crisis 
helped trigger the growth slowdown; episodes of tightening in response to repeated 
supply shocks helped sustain the slowdown. Instead policy could have focused on the 
supply side, tackling the problem at its root. Moreover, domestic interest rates much 
higher than international rates, created arbitrage gaps for carry trade driven inflows 
through gaps in controls. 
 
Reserves, together with the preference for equity over debt liabilities reduced 
vulnerability to crises as currency and maturity mismatches were contained. Large 
reserves held in foreign securities meant gain from currency depreciation, thus lowering 
its impact. Self insurance implied costs but the alternative advocated to allow the rupee to 
float and liberalize debt inflows (Rajan, 2009), would have hurt the country badly during 
the global crises and deleveraging cycle that followed. EMs that followed such advice 
were worst hit.  As Calvo (2005) has documented, sudden stops independent of the 
fundamentals of the country, impose large costs on many EMs.  
 14 
 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) show that in shallow markets domestic firms 
underinsure reversals. Because of domestic financial market imperfections, they cannot 
sell insurance to those who need it. Bond issuance (deepening) would allow firms 
needing external resources to share their revenues with those with access to foreign funds 
thus creating more hedging. This is an example of how markets create value by satisfying 
differentiated needs. Although deeper financial markets and better global governance can 
provide more efficient forms of insurance, policies such as capital inflow taxation, 
liquidity requirements, exchange rate and reserve management, are justified in their 
absence. 
 
Innovative contextual policies are also required. For example, along with the provision of 
more instruments for hedging, random two-way exchange rate movements, large enough 
to deliver a substantial loss to one-way bets are essential to induce hedging or the laying 
off of currency exposure. In East Asia relatively fixed exchange rates, with domestic 
interest rates exceeding international, encouraged unhedged short-term foreign 
borrowing, which made the system extremely sensitive to interest rate changes. 
 
Moderate two-way movement within an implicit 5 percent band over 2004-6 was not 
sufficient to overcome strong expectations of medium term appreciation given India‘s 
high growth rate. In 2007, market expectations of the Rupee-USD rate had even reached 
32. Many corporates borrowed abroad based on such expectations, increasing currency 
risk. Some had entered into so called hedging deals, which were actually bets on the 
value of the Swiss Franc. With the steep rupee depreciation in 2008 many firms lost 
money. Such deals, where Indian banks were often a front for foreign banks, sometimes-
sidestepped existing rules that prevented leverage or underlying risk from exceeding 
export income. Although firms were not allowed to write options, deals were structured 
so that firms were in effect doing so. The deals were so complex that some firms did not 
understand the risks they were taking. The RBI intervened largely to decrease volatility, 
but creating some volatility would have improved incentives to hedge. 
 
 15 
Another post Asian crisis lesson is the danger of short-term debt. As creditors refused to 
rollover such debt, the shock to highly leveraged firms and their banks created 
bankruptcies and intensified the crisis. 
 
India was careful to keep short-term debt low. But with overconfidence from high 
growth, similar higher domestic interest rates, an appreciating rupee, and more freedom, 
firms raised their foreign borrowing
14
. Therefore the liquidity squeeze from outflows, 
drying up of external credit, and the jump in spreads for EMs,
15
 after the fall of Lehman, 
together with the depreciating rupee, was a severe shock to firms‘ balance sheets. The 
Reserve Bank‘s rapid liquidity provision, and the healthy state of Indian banks, allowed 
firms to substitute domestic credit for foreign. Although the fear factor led to a fall in 
consumer credit demand, credit to firms was maintained. There was only a marginal fall 
in aggregate credit growth
16
, unlike in the West.  
 
Indian banks were healthy because the RBI had also followed prescient countercyclical 
macro prudential policies. For example, it increased banks prudential cover for real estate 
loans, thus moderating a property boom. However, the finance ministry‘s relaxation of 
ECB norms during peak inflows acted in the opposite direction to further fuel the spike in 
inflows. 
 
But firms need external finance. Although aggregate savings are high, about half of 
household savings are in a not readily available physical form. Indian debt markets have 
not shown the dynamism of FX, equity and money markets. Instruments to hedge interest 
rate risk are missing. Long-term funds for infrastructure are scarce. Financial exclusion is 
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 External debt had increased to 22 percent of GDP in 2009, with the share of short-term debt (largely 
trade credits) at 21.5 percent (compared to 7 percent in the late nineties) and ECBs at 27.3 percent. Non-
government share of debt rose to 74.6 percent. 
15
 The spread on the Morgan Stanley emerging market bond index (EMBI+) jumped up to 850 in October 
2008, from 300 in August. It did not sustain that peak, but began steadily decreasing from March 2009, and 
in July had reached 400. The index for Asia was the lowest at 330 reflecting the better prospects for this 
region.  
16
 RBI‘s survey showed credit growth to be 20.5 (March 2009) compared to 23.4 (March 2008) in the top 
hundred banking centres. The figures for deposit growth were 21 and 25.7. While credit to industry was 
maintained, personal loan categories showed some fall. In July 2009 annual credit growth of scheduled 
commercial banks was 16.3 compared to 25 a year ago. 
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especially high for smaller firms who cannot access equity markets and international 
markets. The first priority must be to bring more households and firms into the financial 
system. More even access to bank accounts, use of new technology and institutional 
structures, data collection including the availability of credit histories, can improve 
inclusion and intermediation of domestic savings. Until these domestic distortions, 
including large interest gaps and one-way predictable exchange rate movements are 
removed, liberalizing debt inflows has to be done with caution. Unhedged excessive 
private borrowing abroad, driven by domestic distortions, is dangerous. 
 
Liberalization: Policy 
Although improvements are possible, and one can debate timing, mix, degree and 
direction, some flexibility of exchange rates, reserve accumulation in response to volatile 
inflows, graded restrictions on the capital account, market development with 
countercyclical prudential regulations have helped India side-step crises, and achieve 
respectable growth despite financial turbulence. On the whole regulators exhibited a 
healthy contrarian attitude, and democratic pulls and pressures resulted in a middling 
through process. This has a better chance of success in EMs needing development over 
several fronts to achieve robust diversified growth.  
 
Diversified sources do sustain Indian growth including domestic demand, agriculture, 
openness, technology, the demographic profile, the infrastructure cycle, high savings and 
having crossed a critical threshold. As a net commodity importer India gains from lower 
global prices. Dependence on external demand is low compared to other Asian countries. 
While foreign capital does not contribute much to aggregate resources it is useful in 
financial intermediation. But post crisis a sufficient quantity of inflows have revived.   
 
Post Lehman growth did not collapse as those who believed India‘s performance to be 
entirely dependent on foreign largesse expected. Given our export share of 15 percent, 
the trade shock reduced GDP one percent below potential in 2008-09. The health of the 
financial sector also helped a V shaped recovery unlike in the West, where financial 
sector weaknesses and low demand imply persistent weakness. 
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Monetary and fiscal policy responded rapidly and in a coordinated fashion to the crisis. 
The global push for individual country government‘s to provide a demand stimulus 
allowed us to do what we needed. The post reform Indian macro policy combination was 
fiscal loosening and monetary tightening. This has adverse consequences when the 
structure of the economy is as depicted in Figure 2. Frequent supply shocks and chronic 
fiscal waste push up an elastic supply curve as costs rise. It is elastic since output is 
generally below potential as a large labour force shifts, during a catch-up high growth 
phase, to more productive occupations. Inflation expectations, fiscal populism and 
distortions are other factors pushing up the supply curve. Monetary tightening, in such 
circumstances, has a high output cost with little effect on inflation, as it pushes the 
demand curve leftwards.  Better fiscal rules will make more relaxed monetary policy 
feasible.  
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Figure 2: Aggregate demand (AD) and supply (AS) 
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Fiscal Policy 
High Indian growth despite high deficits is regarded as a puzzle. But Indian private 
savings are high enough to cover for some government dissaving, thus preventing a large 
current account deficit and potential currency crises. Moreover, high transitional growth 
in a populous country reduces deficit and debt ratios. To the extent government 
expenditure helps maintain high growth it is sustainable. 
 
But there is a tendency for unproductive populist expenditure and waste in a low-per 
capita income democracy. India has seen successful tax reform and elasticity in revenues 
but reform in expenditure management has been lacking. The Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management (FRBM) Act adopted in 2003 has been kept in letter rather than 
spirit. Where necessary, capital expenditure has been cut, and off balance sheet items 
used to achieve targets. Better incentive features are possible. For example, expenditure 
caps can improve incentives to comply, while protecting productive expenditure. The 
composition of public expenditure would then change towards human, social and 
physical capital. The Thirteenth Finance Commission has enabled some countercyclical 
fiscal policy by setting paths for debt reduction. The post crisis experience has 
demonstrated the efficacy of a fiscal stimulus when output falls below potential. 
 
Monetary Policy  
Operational monetary policy needs to respond to outcomes rather than be tied to nominal 
money supply targets based on uncertain estimates of rapidly changing potential output. 
It should gradually move to becoming more forward-looking, responding to forecasts of 
inflation, so as to more successfully anchor inflation expectations at lower output cost. 
The aim should be more to reduce costs or shift the supply curve downwards in 
anticipation of cost shocks. Low interest rates help to facilitate the supply response. 
Short-term nominal exchange rate flexibility can also contribute. Of all the monetary 
transmission channels the lag from the exchange rate to CPI is the shortest. The higher 
the weight of imported goods in CPI the more effective is this channel. This weight rises 
as border prices begin to affect food prices. Food is still a major component of the 
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average Indian consumption basket. If dependence on oil imports is also high, an inverse 
movement of the exchange rate in response to commodity price shocks can moderate 
inflation. 
 
Such a response of the nominal exchange rate to temporary supply shocks also 
contributes to crises proofing. The ensuing two-way movement removes an implicit 
government guarantee and encourages hedging to reduce risk. But it is also necessary to 
limit excessive volatility, even as homeopathic doses of volatility strengthen thin 
markets. There is room to surprise markets at times and work with them to achieve 
targets at others.  
 
A more appreciated nominal rate can help sustain a positive interest rate differential to 
the extent it leads to expected future depreciation, although with a large interest 
differential some restrictions on the capital account will be required. 
 
But the real exchange rate must not depart for long from competitive equilibrium levels. 
Productivity improvements allow a more appreciated non-inflationary equilibrium real 
exchange rate. The latter is inversely related to real wages—rising average wages require 
a more appreciated real exchange rate. But a rise in the average wage level cannot occur 
until surplus labour is absorbed in the modern sector—thus limiting real appreciation. 
Balassa-Samuelson type appreciation of the real exchange rate, driven by equality of 
wages across sectors with varying productivity, comes at a later stage, when the labour 
transition is complete. If the average real wage is low, nominal appreciation will not lead 
to real appreciation since prices will not rise. If conversely, the real exchange rate 
compatible with the minimum wage is more appreciated than that warranted by labour 
productivity, a spiral of wage price inflation results. A better alternative to divorcing food 
prices from border prices through a tariff-food subsidy-procurement barrier is direct 
income transfers to those below the poverty line.  In the longer term steps must be taken 
to raise agricultural productivity.  
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Since domestic interest rates generally exceed international, liberalization gives policy 
the opportunity to reduce domestic rates, thus closing the arbitrage gap
17
 to the extent 
compatible with the domestic cycle, the inflation differential, any risk premium, and a 
reasonable return to savings. High spreads also have to be reduced. A lower interest rate 
stimulates the supply response, maintaining the higher growth feasible in transition 
economies. It also reduces the cost of government debt. High savings and long-term 
capital inflows invalidate the argument that developing countries interest rates have to be 
higher to reflect the scarcity of capital.  
 
Low interest rates are said to create asset price bubbles in thin markets. But the answer is 
to use counter-cyclical prudential regulation and deepen markets, not give up the chance 
to stimulate capital accumulation.  
 
Monetary policy looses autonomy under a fixed exchange rate and a fully open capital 
account—to the extent the capital account is not fully open and the exchange rate has 
some flexibility, monetary policy is effective. This effectiveness is further enhanced by 
the use of tools such as FX markets intervention, and as markets deepen, signaling to 
affect the exchange rate, freeing the interest rate for the domestic cycle. 
 
As long as poor global governance and regulation create excess volatility of foreign 
inflows EMs must implement different kinds of self and group insurance. The priority 
must be on strengthening domestic institutions with capital convertibility to follow only 
after stringent preconditions are met. One of these is reform of the international financial 
architecture. Calls for reform after every crisis die down with the crisis. If the greater 
representation of EMs in the G-20 fructifies in real improvements, risks of openness will 
                                                 
17
 Despite restrictions on debt flows and limits on open positions, international banks found ways 
participate in the carry trade, where they borrowed in low interest currencies such as the yen and lent in 
high interest countries. This was one reason for weakness of the low interest rate dollar and yen, prior to the 
crisis. After the crisis the carry trade unwound because although the arbitrage gaps continued, credit had 
frozen. In addition, invisible flows in the current account are correlated to interest differentials. Export 
payments can be sent earlier and import credit invested locally. NRI loans to relatives can be disguised as 
transfers—all the more since the purpose does not have to be specified for remittances of less than rupees 5 
lakhs.  
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be lowered. The absence of major change almost two years after Lehman does not bode 
well, however.  
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List of Abbreviations: 
 
AD Aggregate Demand 
AS Aggregate Supply 
BIS Bank of International Settlements 
BSE Bombay Stock Exchange 
CAC Capital Account Convertibility 
CAD Current Account Deficit 
CB Central Bank 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CRR Compulsory Reserve Requirements 
ECB External Commercial Borrowing 
EMs Emerging Markets 
FCY Foreign Currency 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
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FPI Foreign Portfolio Investment 
FRBM Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
FX  Foreign Exchange 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IIF Institute of International Finance 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INR Indian Rupee 
MSS Market Stabilization Scheme 
NRI Non Resident Indian 
RBI Reserve Bank of India 
RDs Reporting Dealers 
SEC US Securities Regulator 
SLR Statutory Liquidity Requirements 
USD US Dollar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
